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the initial price of the resource with regard to the initial stock of the resource is greater than minus
one. The ratio of the consumption levels of the two countries are shown to be constant over time,
and determined by the ratio of initial wealth. An analytical solution of the model allows us to
indicate how accumulable and depletable assets aﬀect per country welfare and income growth. For
this case we demonstrate that a technological change -that is nonrenewable resource saving- can
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1. Introduction
The economics of nonrenewable resources has received increased attention following the empir-
ical observations of Sachs and Warner (1995). They perform cross-country growth regressions and
ﬁnd that economies with large natural resource based exports to GDP ratios in 1971 tended to expe-
rience relatively low growth rates in the subsequent period (1971-89). More recent research has led
to contradicting results. For example, Stijns (2001) employs diﬀerent indicators of natural resource
abundance than those used by Sachs and Warner and ﬁnds no evidence that resource abundance
is a detriment for economic growth. Ding and Field (2004) distinguish between natural resource
endowments and natural resource dependence and ﬁnd that, across countries, natural resources do
not aﬀect growth. Given this puzzling empirical evidence, the challenge is whether an acceptable
theoretical model can help advance our understanding of how resource abundance aﬀects economic
growth. To this end, Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) consider a single economy which exports all of the
oil extracted, eventually totally depleting the nonrenewable resource stock. However, the economy
does not use oil for own production or consumption, implying that the rest of the world must be
diﬀerent than the economy they study, nor can the rest of the world’s transition growth impact the
resource rich country.
In contrast to Rodríguez and Sachs (1999), we study a two country world economy. In particular,
this paper analyzes how initial factor endowments of nonrenewable resources and accumulable
resources inﬂuence income, growth and welfare in a two country world. We show analytically that,
in principle, whether a nonrenewable resource rich country grows faster or slower than another
country depends upon economic structure.
Previous work in this area includes Asheim (1986) and Hartwick (1995) who study a two country
world and investigate whether constant consumption paths are achievable when the economies invest
resource rents in new capital. Chiarella (1980), focuses on international trade aspects of a world
economy with two countries and shows that if countries are equally patient then consumption
growth across countries is identical. This implies that the ratio between consumption levels (across
countries) must be constant over time. Chiarella determines this ratio for the long run (steady state)
case when the utility function is logarithmic and discount factors across countries are diﬀerent.
Geldrop and Withagen (1993) generalize Chiarella’s (1980) approach, by introducing n number of
trading partners. Among others, they concentrate on equilibrium existence, but they do not study
cross-country diﬀerences on consumption, income or growth.
Our analysis provides insights into how diﬀerences in nonrenewable resources and capital en-
dowments aﬀect economic performance. Consequently, we ignore other diﬀerences across countries.
The economies considered are thus identical, except for the initial endowments of assets (capital)3
and the nonrenewable resource. As in other models of trade, factor price equalization across coun-
tries occurs. The rental rate of capital across countries is equal even in the absence of international
borrowing and lending. This result implies that the growth rates of consumption across countries
are equal. Thus, as in Chiarella (1980), the ratio of consumption across countries is constant
over time. Regardless of income growth, relative welfare across countries is shown to remain un-
changed. Hence, the question that comes to mind is: shouldn’t we instead be concerned about how
initial endowments of capital and the nonrenewable resource aﬀect relative welfare instead of how
nonrenewable resources aﬀect relative income growth? We show that the ratio of the nonrenewable-
resource-rich country’s consumption to the nonrenewable-resource-less economy’s consumption is
c o n s t a n ta n di sd e t e r m i n e db yt h er a t i oo ft h e i rr e s p e c t i v ev a l u eo fa s s e t sa ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e .
Wealth of the resource-rich country is shown to increases with its initial stock of the resource. This
eﬀect is counterbalanced, to some degree, by the negative eﬀect of the initial stock of the depletable
resource on the price of the nonrenewable.
We also prove that the initial endowment of the nonrenewable resource has a positive eﬀect
on the GDP growth rate of the resource-rich country as long as the elasticity of the initial price
of the resource with regard to the initial stock of the resource is greater than minus one. An
analytical solution of the model under a parameter restriction indicates that indeed this elasticity
is greater than minus one. Thus, the result of Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) that: the initial stock
of the resource inﬂuences negatively the GDP growth of an economy that exports a nonrenewable
resource, is shown to not hold in general. That is, depending upon structure, a non-renewable
resource rich economy can grow faster or slower than an economy without this resource. This
result derives mostly from the fact that Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) consider an isolated country,
and thus they failed to account for inter-country linkages that inﬂuence the rest of the world’s
transitional dynamics. While it is possible that nonrenewable resources rich economies are growing
slower because of rent seeking activities and the like, Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) conclude that
owning a large amount of the resource alone is suﬃcient to generate negative growth, we ﬁnd this
not to be the case. Finally, we show that a technological change that is saving on the nonrenewable
resource can beneﬁt the resource-rich country’s welfare when compared to the other economy. We
also obtain the result that even though the non-renewable resource is an essential input (as in
the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function), the two world economy is sustainable forever
depending upon the magnitude of the household’s rate of time discount relative to the Harrod rate
of nonrenewable resource saving technological change.
An overview of the model is as follows. Similar to Chiarella (1980), we model a world economy
with two countries that are engaged in international trade. Diﬀerent from Chiarella (1980), we
allow the two countries to be engaged in the production of a ﬁnal good as in Geldrop and Withagen4
(1993). Capital and a nonrenewable resource are used as factors of production and we assume that
both countries have access to the same technology to produce the ﬁnal good. A single country
owns the entire stock of the nonrenewable. This country has an extracting sector that depletes the
nonrenewable by maximizing discounted proﬁts. The economies trade internationally the ﬁnal good
and the nonrenewable, but international borrowing and lending is not allowed. Each country has
a representative consumer that derives satisfaction from consuming the ﬁnal good and maximizes
discounted instant utility, subject to a budget constraint. The rental rate of capital of each country
is determined endogenously and equals the marginal physical product of capital in each country.
Finally a market clearing condition for the nonrenewable resource endogenously determines its
price.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two we introduce the model where a nonrenewable
resource and capital are used as inputs in production. In section three we characterize equilibrium,
prove the stability of the system and look at the eﬀect of the nonrenewable resource on income
growth an relative welfare. In section four we provide an analytical solution under a restriction on
parameter values. In section ﬁve we provide numerical simulations and conclude in section 6.
2. The model
Consider the environment of a two-country world in which one of the countries is endowed with
a nonrenewable-resource (referred to as country one) and the other is a nonrenewable-resource-
less country (referred to as country two). The representative consumer of each country seeks
to maximize discounted utility of consumption subject to a budget constraint. Across countries
consumers have identical preferences and identical discount factors. Whereas country one owns and
can deplete the nonrenewable, both economies have an amount of capital that each combines with
the nonrenewable resource to produce an identical ﬁnal good. The ﬁnal good technology is given
by





where Ki and Ri for i =1 ,2 denote the amount of capital and the nonrenewable resource employed
in the production of output Yi of country i and η is the growth rate of a resource saving technological
progress. The price of the ﬁnal good is numeraire. Let ri denote the rental rate of capital in country
i. To maximize proﬁts the ﬁnal good sector of country i sets the marginal physical product of each








where q denotes the price of the nonrenewable resource. Since country one exports the nonrenewable
to country two, in the absence of trade distortions, the nonrenewable is traded at the same price






















Equating this expression to Yi from (3), provides a relationship between the rental rate of capital
r and the price of the nonrenewable resource:
ri =
³










Equation (5) suggests that, the Heckscher-Ohlin tendency for factor price equalization is satis-







indicating that the ratio of Ri
Ki across countries is the same.2
2.1. Extracting sector




where δ is the constant depreciation rate of capital. Notice that holding one unit of capital yields a
gross return r1 (τ) at instant of time τ, but, since capital depreciates, the net return from holding
one unit of capital at time τ equals r1 (τ)−δ. Presuming perfect capital markets in country one, as in
Geldrop and Withagen (1994 p. 1014), ω(t) is a present-value factor that converts a unit of revenue
at time t into an equivalent unit of revenue at time zero. We presume that extractions are costless.
2If the proﬁt maximization problem of the ﬁnal good sector were set as a dynamic problem, as in Geldrop and
Withagen (1994), the same ﬁrst order conditions are obtained.6
Using ω(t) to discount proﬁts, the extracting sector ﬁnds the optimal path of extractions R(t) that
maximizes the present value of proﬁts subject to the constraint that cumulative extractions do not
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Rdt ≤ S0}. (8)
The Lagrangian of this isoperimetric problem is given by
L = qRe−
R t
0(r1(τ)−δ)dτ − λR (9)








0(r1(τ)−δ)dτ =0 . (10)




= r1 (t) − δ. (11)
This condition indicates that the real price q, of the nonrenewable resource must grow at the real
interest rate, or equivalently, the Solow-Stiglitz (Solow, 1974 and Stiglitz, 1974) eﬃciency condition
holds. (11) indicates that the nonrenewable is an asset and for the economy to have incentives to
hold the nonrenewable it must be that its price must grow at the real rate of interest. Substituting






































3If we had integrated the extracting activity into the optimization problem of the consumer of country one the
same results would had been obtained.7
where Λ =
³
αα (1 − α)
1−α
´ 1
α and q(0) remains to be determined. Importantly, notice that the













Thus, the rate of growth of the resource saving technological change, η, positively inﬂuences
the long-run growth rate price of the nonrenewable resource. Similar to the standard Ramsey
model in which labor augmenting technological change positively inﬂuences the long-run labor
wage rate, here a resource saving technological change positively inﬂuences the long-run price of
the nonrenewable resource.
2.2. Consumers’ optimization problems
2.2.1. Resource-rich country
The representative consumer of country one solves the problem of maximizing discounted utility









˙ K1 (t)=( r1 − δ)K1 (t)+π (t) − c1 (t) (16)
given K1 (0) = K0,1 > 0,
where 1
θ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ρ>0 is a discount factor, and δ is
the constant rate of capital depreciation. π denotes the proﬁts of the extracting sector. Initial
and instant t stock of capital for country one are K0,1 and K1 (t), respectively. Since extraction is
costless π(t)=q(t)R(t) holds. Thus, the budget constraint of country one (16) can be rewritten
as
˙ K1 (t)=( r1 − δ)K1 (t)+q(t)R(t) − c1 (t). (17)8
Notice that since only country one owns the resource, the rate of extraction consists of what is used
for domestic consumption plus an amount that is exported.
2.2.2. Resource less country
The representative consumer of country two solves the problem of maximizing discounted utility









˙ K2 (t)=( r2 − δ)K2 (t) − c2 (t) (19)
given K2 (0) = K0,2 > 0.
Where K0,2 and K2 (t) are, respectively, the initial and instant t capital stocks of country two.




ri − δ − ρ
θ







=0 for i =1 ,2 (21)
Notice that the implication of r1 equaling r2, implies that c1 and c2 grow at identical rates. Using













for i =1 ,2. (22)









θt for i =1 ,2. (23)9
Since q(t) can transitionally decline or increase, ci (t) can follow a similar pattern, albeit inﬂuenced
by the discount factor and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Using (23) the transversality





=0 for i =1 ,2. (24)
3. Equilibrium characterization
An equilibrium for this economy are paths of quantities ci (t), Yi (t), Ki,(t) Ri (t), R(t) and
prices q(t), ri (t) for i =1 ,2 such that ci (t),a n dKi (t) solve the consumer’s optimization problem
of country i, Yi (t), Ki (t), Ri (t) solve the optimization problem of the ﬁnal good sector of country i,
R(t) solves the maximization problem of the extracting sector of country one, and the nonrenewable
resource market clears, i.e.,
R1 (t)+R2 (t)=R(t). (25)
Proposition 1. The ratio
c1(t)
c2(t) is constant for all t and equals the present value of the ratio of
the assets of country one and country two
q(t)S(t)+K1(t)
K2(t) at time t.
Proof. See proof in Appendix A¥
Let µ ≡
c1(t)












Remark: This result implies that relative consumption is determined from time zero. This
result suggests that consumption is inﬂuenced forever by each country’s initial wealth, i.e., by the
value of each country’s assets in time t =0 .S i n c e S0,K 0,1 and K0,2 are given, then µ can be
determined if q(0) were known.
We have shown thus far that:
Corollary 1.
i) Factor price equalization across countries result. The rental rate of capital across countries
is equal even in the absence of international borrowing and lending.10
ii) The Solow-Stiglitz eﬃciency criterion that the price of the nonrenewable resource grows at
the real interest rate is satisﬁed.
iii) The Harrod rate of growth positively inﬂuences the long-run growth rate of price of the
nonrenewable resource.










3.1. The reduced system
To study the long-run stability properties of the model, it is useful to normalize the variables
of the model, and in order to decrease the dimensionality of the system.
Proposition 2. An equilibrium, if it exists, converges to a balanced growth path with growth
rates
gq = η, gKi = gci =
η − ρ
θ
≡ gK,g Ri = gR = gS =
(1 − θ)η − ρ
θ
(27)
for i =1 ,2 and r is constant. Where gv denotes the long-run growth rate of variable v.
Proof See appendix A¥
Remark: Notice the important result suggested by (27),namely, even though S(0) is an essen-
tial non-renewable resource, these economies are sustainable in the long run (gci = 0) if the growth
rate of technological change is equal to or greater than the consumers’ discount factor.
Let K = K1 + K2. Variables are now normalized by their corresponding growth rate as follows
ˆ K =
K
egK t, ˆ Ki =
Ki
egK t, ˆ ci =
c1
egK t,( 2 8 )
ˆ q =
q
eηt, ˆ S =
S
egS t, ˆ R =
R
egS t, ˆ Ri =
Ri
egS t
In this way the normalized variables (b) will remain constant along the growth path. To study the
stability of the model we ﬁnd it useful to reduce the system of equations to the smallest possible







, ˆ c1 = µˆ c2 (29)11
where T is a state variable and g is a control like variable, and µ>0 is a constant. Since all the
variables have been normalized, T and g will remain constant in the long-run. Recall that since c1
and c2 grow (forever) at the same rate, then ˆ c1 (t)=µˆ c2 (t) for all t. Taking the time derivative of
T and using
·
ˆ S = − ˆ R − gS ˆ S, (6) and (25) so that ˆ R = r
ˆ q
1−α
α ˆ K we obtain:








− δ − η − (1 + µ)gT
´
(30)
Note that ˆ c2 = gˆ S and ˆ c2
ˆ K = gT. Similarly, taking the log time derivative of g yields:
˙ g =
µ























Thus, the ﬁrst order conditions of the model can be reduced to a system of three diﬀerential
equations, (32), (30) and (31) in three variables T, g and ˆ q.
3.1.1. Stability
Here we investigate the stability properties of the of the lung run equilibrium of the reduced
system. The equilibrium is locally unique if the Jacobian of the reduced system has two eigenvalues
with positive real parts and one with a negative real part. The reason is because the initial condition



























ˆ q equal to zero and employing (33) we obtain the long run or steady state
values for T, g ˆ q and r respectively given by12
ˆ q∗ =
Ã





















and r∗ = η + δ (36)
variables with the superscript ∗ denote steady state values. The Jacobian matrix of (34) evaluated


















q denotes the partial derivative of ¯ g with respect to q evaluated at the steady state, and
similarly for the other elements of J∗. The eigenvalues (ξi) of J∗ are given by ξ1 = −1−α
α r∗ =
−1−α
α (η + δ) together with the two solutions to the quadratic equation in ξ
ξ
¡¯ TT − ξ
¢
+ ¯ Tg¯ gT =0 (38)
which equal
ξ2 = −gS > 0 ξ3 =( 1+µ)g∗T∗ > 0 (39)
This leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium is locally unique.
Proof. Notice that ξ1 = −1−α
α (η + δ) is negative. In Appendix A we show that ξ2 and ξ3 are
the solutions to (38) which are positive. Since there is a single negative eigenvalue the equilibrium
is locally unique and stable¥
Remark: This result facilitates an empirical analysis as it eliminates the need to search for
other equilibria.13
3.2. Growth
To provide insights on how the nonrenewable resource aﬀects GDP growth, we proceed by
examining the share of country iG D Pin aggregate (global) GDP. If the share of country i0sG D P
in world GDP changes along the growth path, then one of the countries transitionally grows slower
than the other.





where GDPw (t) equals GDP1 (t)+GDP2 (t). In particular4 s2 (t)=α
K2(t)
K(t) where as before K =
K1 + K2.
Proposition 4. At time zero, the share of GDP of country i for i =1 ,2 on global GDPw does








where K0 denotes the sum of the initial stocks of capital of country one and two (K0,1 + K0,2).
Proof .C o u n t r yGDP is, respectively, given by
GDP1 = rK1 + qR GDP2 = rK2. (42)






(K1 + K2) (43)
Substituting this result into the deﬁnition of GDP of country one and computing GDPw yields
the proposition.¥
Remark: A reason for the share si (0) of the i-th country to depend on the stock of the
resource S, but rather on capital, is because the productivity of R(0) is inﬂuenced by capital but
not by the stock of the resource.
Let κi be the share of capital of country i in total (global) capital as follows
4Note that GDP










Since Ki and K growth at the same rate in the long run, the share of capital of country i in the






w h e r ea tt i m ez e r oκ0,i =
K0,i
K0 are given to the economy. For the case of country two
ˆ K∗
2 = κ∗
2 ˆ K∗. (46)







where µ is a constant for all t. This implies that
q(0)S (0) + K1 (0)
K2 (0)
=





where, as before, variables with the superscript ∗ denote state values and ˆ denote normalized
variables. Condition (48) can be rewritten as
q(0)S (0) + K1 (0)
K2 (0)
=
ˆ q∗ ˆ S∗
κ∗








ˆ K∗ we obtain
















κ2 (0)K (0)(1 + q∗T∗)
K (0) + q(0)S (0)
(51)
Since the share of GDP of country two in total GDP equals s2 (t)=α
K2(t)





κ2 (0)K (0)(1 + q∗T∗)
K (0) + q(0)S (0)
. (52)
Thus, if





κ2 (0)K0 (1 + q∗T∗)
K0 + q(0)S0
. (53)
then we have the result that that the resource-less country is transitionally growing faster than the
resource-rich economy. A result that would seem consistent with the results of Sachs and Warner
(1995).
B u tt ow h a td e g r e ei ss∗
2 aﬀected by the natural resource and how? Our problem relies on the
fact that in general it is not possible to solve for the value of the resource at time zero q(0).I fq(0)
is a relation of S0, perhaps also of K0, lets presume that such solution for q(0) exists and denote
this solution as
Q0 (S0,K 0) (54)
The eﬀect of S0 on s∗
2 is given by
−α
κ2 (0)K (0)(1 + q∗T∗)


















> 0, then the
nonrenewable resource enhances GDP growth of the resource-rich economy.














the eﬀect of S0 on s∗
1 is positive¥
Remark: We have thus established conditions whereby either empirical results of Sachs and
Warner (1995) or the contrary results of Stijns (2001) are obtainable.








> 0 s i n c ew ee x p e c t
∂Q0
∂S0 < 0.T h a ti s ,a s
the stock of the resource increases we expect the price q(0) to decline. While in general we are








q(0) > −1. But, our





We next proceed to an analytical solution for the special case where α = θ..16
4. Analytical solution
So far integration techniques have provide a general analytical solution. We now proceed with
an analytical solution for the case where the parameter values are restricted, to (α = θ). The ﬁrst
step is to determine the solution for this case reveals about evolution of the two economies.
Proposition 6. If α = θ the price of the nonrenewable resource and aggregate consumption
(C ≡ c1 + c2) at time zero equal
q(0) =
(1 − α)αα
















and the rate of extraction and aggregate capital (K ≡ K1 + K2) for all t equal
R(t)=



















Proposition 5 implies that with a suﬃciently large initial endowment of the nonrenewable resource,
the resource-rich economy can experience larger GDP growth rates than the resource-less economy.
This result contradicts the results found by Rodríguez and Sachs (1999). This contradiction comes
from the fact that Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) consider an isolated country, and thus they fail
to take into account the inter-country linkages and the eﬀects of these linkages on the world’s
transition dynamics.
From (57) we observe that aggregate consumption at time zero (C (0)) depends on the aggregate
level of capital K0, Consumption at time zero is not inﬂuenced by the initial level of the nonrenew-
able resource. In Appendix B, we show that for the transversality condition to hold, it must be
that ρ − (1 − α)η>0, which also guarantees q(0) > 0. Finally, the restriction α = θ also implies
that the rate of depletion of R declines at the negative constant rate of
(1−α)η−ρ
α .















Proof. Substituting q(0) into
q(0)S0+K0,1
K0,2 the result is obtained.
Remark. F r o ms i m p l ec a l c u l a t i o no n ec a no b t a i nt h ee ﬀect of K0,2 on µ. The eﬀect of country
two’s initial capital endowment on µ is negative. Thus, the capital stock of country two negatively
inﬂuences the consumption of the resource rich country relative to the resource less economy. Note
that ratio c1




(1 − α)(1− α)αα









However, this eﬀect is important to the extent by which the share of the resource is large. In
particular, if (1 − α) is small, the consumer of country one’s beneﬁt from owning the resource is






. Thus, a relatively small (1 − α) severely reduces the eﬀect of the resource.
Interestingly, the consumption of country one (the resource-rich economy) relative to the con-
sumption of country two (the resource-less economy) increases with the size of the growth rate of
the resource saving technological change η.
5. Simulations
At this point our main concern is that the analytical solution’s result presented in section 4,
indicating that larger amounts of the resource positively aﬀect the growth rate of the resource
rich economy, may only be coincidental. To verify if this is the case we simulate the model under
parameter values that are more consistent with other features of the data. First we want to verify
if indeed the ratio c1
c2 is constant over time. Later we ﬁnd initial endowments of the nonrenewable
resource stock and capital that are consistent with c1
c2 =
q(0)S0+K0,1
K0,2 as the model indicates. To
this end we use the consumption levels in purchasing power parity obtained from the World Bank
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2004) of all countries for which data is available for the period
1980-2000. To obtain consumption levels in purchasing power parity we have computed the share
of consumption in total GDP for each country in the sample, and multiplied this share by GDP
in purchasing power parity. When it was impossible to obtain the share of consumption on GDP
from the WDI (2004) we have obtained consumption share data from the International Monetary
Fund International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2002). Combining both sources of data allows
us to include most of the non-oil-exporting and oil-exporting countries, including Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and Iran. To follow the model’s setting as much as we can, we have divided the world into18
two regions, a nonrenewable-resource-rich region (countries whose oil exports are more than 25% of
total merchandise exports) and a resource-poor region otherwise. Our sample includes 74 resource-
poor5 and 19 resource-rich countries. We have added the consumption level in purchasing power
parity of the countries of each region and have divided this number by its respective population,
and obtained what we called per-capita consumption of a resource rich (c1) and resource poor (c2)

















Most likely the larger ratio c1
c2 observed at the begging of the 80’s relates to the oil crises
experienced during that period. Interestingly, the ratio of the per-capita consumption levels remains
within the 56-68% interval. In particular, during the 1990’s this ratio only ﬂuctuated between the
56-61% interval . For illustrative purposes Figure 2 shows the growth experience of the two regions.
While indeed the oil-rich countries in average grew slower during the 1980-2000 period (the yearly
average of the oil-rich economies was 1.1% versus 2% for the oil-poor economies). Since our objective
is to verify if, in the absence of any distortion, owning larger amounts of the resource is suﬃcient
to generate smaller or negative growth rates, as Rodriguez and Sachs indicate, Table 2 does not
5We have excluded South Africa due to its large mining activity.19
speak against or in favor of any argument.
Figure 2





1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
%
N nonrenewable-resource-poor region, — nonrenewable-resource-rich region
To perform our simulations we assume the following parameter values α =0 .82,θ=2 .5 (a
relatively large number, but we want to depart from the value of α) δ =0 .04,ρ=0 .03 and η =0 .1






). We then choose values for
S0 (= 1), K0,1 (= 10),a n dK0,2 (= 90) that generate a ratio of c1
c2 =0 .62. Our simulations consist of
increasing the endowment of the nonrenewable resource as to see if indeed this can generate lower
growth rates for the resource-rich region that the ones of the resource-poor region. In Figure 3 we
have plotted the GDP growth diﬀerence between the resource rich and the resource poor country µ
·
GDP1





for three diﬀerent levels of the stock of the nonrenewable resource (1,
2 and 10). From Figure 3 we observe that increases in the endowment of the nonrenewable resource
positively increase the diﬀerence between the growth rates, indicating that as the initial stock of
the resource increases the more the resource-rich economy grows. We have performed many other
simulations, that we do not report here, but in all the cases larger endowments of the resource



























In Table 1 we also report how the price of the nonrenewable resource at time zero changes as a
result of a change in the resource endowment.
Table 1
S=1 S=2 S=10
q(0) 45.8833 23.3479 4.8472
µ µ µ µ 0.6200 0.6300 0.6497
From Table 1 we see that with an initial stock of the resource equal to one the price of the resource
equals 45.88. If we double the stock of the resource to S0 =2the price of the resource declines and
equals 23.35. Note, however, that this decline is less than proportional to the increase of the stock
of the resource, indicating that the elasticity of the price of the resource is negative and greater than
minus one. This result is thus, consistent with Proposition 5 which indicates that if the elasticity
of the price of the resource at time zero with regard to the stock of the resource is grater than
minus one this is suﬃcient for the stock of the resource to positively inﬂuence the relative income
growth rate of the resource-rich economy. In Table 1 we have also included the value of µ = c1
c2 for
the diﬀerent levels of the initial stock of the resource considered. Our simulations indicates that
the eﬀect of the increase of the resource in relative welfare (c1
c2) is small but positive. This reﬂects
the fact that larger endowments of the nonrenewable negatively aﬀect the price of the resource and
thus its end eﬀect on µ is small.21
6. Conclusions
This paper examines the impact of nonrenewable resources on economic growth and relative
welfare in a two country world economy. We introduce a nonrenewable - resource - rich economy
and a nonrenewable-less country in an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model. As in other
models of trade, factor price equalization across countries is shown to result. In particular, the
rental rate of capital across countries is equal even in the absence of international borrowing and
lending. This result implies that the growth rates of consumption across countries are equal and
therefore, the ratio of consumption levels is constant. We show that the ratio of the consumption
of the resource-rich country to the consumption of the resource-less economy equals the ratio of
the value of assets at any point in time. While the resource-rich country wealth increases with the
initial stock of the resource, this eﬀect is counterbalanced, to some degree, by the negative eﬀect
of the initial stock of the resource on the price of the nonrenewable.
We show that the initial endowment of the nonrenewable resource has a positive eﬀect on the
GDP growth rate of the resource-rich country as long as the elasticity of the initial price of the
resource with regard to the initial stock of the resource is greater than minus one. An analytical
solution of the model under a parameter restriction indicates that indeed this elasticity is greater
than minus one. Thus, we ﬁnd the result of Rodríguez and Sachs (1999), indicating that the
initial stock of the resource inﬂuences negatively the GDP growth of an economy that exports a
nonrenewable resource, does not to hold in general. This contradiction comes from the fact that
Rodríguez and Sachs (1999) consider an isolated country, and thus they miss to account for any
iteration of the economy they analyze and the rest of the world transitional dynamics.
Finally, we show that a technological change -that is saving on the nonrenewable resource- can
beneﬁt the resource-rich country welfare when compared to the resource-less economy.
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Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
Using (23), and r − δ =
˙ q(t)



























































Since the ratio c1






(K1 + K2). (65)
The budget constraint of the consumer of country one can be rewritten as





(K1 + K2). (66)
Using
˙ q



































= S (τ) − lim
t→∞
S (t).
Since depletion is costless lim
t→∞







































θt dt = S (τ). (69)













θt dt = q(τ)S (τ)+K1 (τ). (70)




















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2






= η = gq, lim
t→∞
r = η + δ ≡ r∗ (73)
hence, r is constant in the long run. Thus, the per country growth rate of consumption is constant













The ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁnal good sectors in each country (equation (6))a n dt h em a r k e t













where K = K1 + K2. Since r is constant in the long run, (75) indicates that in the long run the






















Next notice that ˙ S = −R, thus the growth rate of S equals the ratio
˙ S
S = −R
S. Since extraction is




















Implying that as t →∞both R and S grow at the same rate, (this result was previously derived
by Dasgupta and Heal, 1974). What remains to show is that gci = gKi.O b s e r v et h a t(75) implies
that q R
K is constant in the long run, since in the long run S and R grow at the same rate, then, it
is also the case that χ ≡
qS
K is constant in the long run. Taking the log time derivative of χ, using
˙ S = −R, and qR = 1−α











































where C = c1 +c2. Since both c1 and c2 grow at the same rate, then C also grows at the same rate





, thus, for (79) to hold it must be
that C
K is constant in the long run and therefore, C and K must asymptotically grow at the same






η(1 − θ) − ρ
θ
= gR
For the transversality condition (10) to hold it must also be the case that gR = gS < 0. Finally,
since K = K1 + K2 then it is straightforward to show that
gKi = gK = gci¥


















6For the tranversality condition (10) to hold it must be that lim
t→∞R =026



















r∗ < 0. (82)
The other two are values of ξ that solve the quadratic equation in ξ given by





(1 + µ)g∗ =0 (83)
or
ξ2 + bξ + d =0 (84)
where b = −((1 + µ)g∗T∗ − gS) and d = r∗
q∗
1−α
α (1 + µ)g∗.U s i n gg∗ from (35) we obtain
µ










(1 + µ)g∗ =( η − gK)
µ















=( η − gK)T∗. (87)
From (27) it is the case that (η − gK)=−gS. Using (87) notice that d can be rewritten as
d = −gS (1 + µ)g∗T∗ (88)






where D =( ( 1+µ)g∗T∗ − gS)
2 +4 gS (1 + µ)g∗T∗. Further manipulation of D yields
D =( 1 + µ)
2 (g∗T∗)
2 +2 gS (1 + µ)g∗T∗ + g2
S (90)
=( ( 1 + µ)g∗T∗ + gS)
2
substituting into (89)
−b ± ((1 + µ)g∗T∗ + gS)
2
(91)
the remaining eigenvalues of J∗ equal
ξ2 = −gS ξ3 =( 1+µ)g∗T∗
which are positive¥
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q (K1 + K2). To determine R we need to ﬁnd a solution for aggregate capital K = K1+K2.
Since ˙ K = ˙ K1 + ˙ K2 using both budget constant and denoting C = c1 + c2, ˙ K equals
˙ K =( r − δ)K +
1 − α
α
rK − C, (92)
which is a ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation with a variable coeﬃcient. Using
˙ q
q = r − δ, its general








































































































































0 Rdt = S0 and (95) we obtain
Z ∞
0















































α (η+δ)t − 1
´





























For (97) to converge to the constant S0 it must be that
















< 0 must be satisﬁed, this implies that (97)
converges. Solving for q(0) we get,
q(0) =
(1 − α)αα















































α (ρ − (1 − α)η)
e
ρ




Substituting (100) into R(t)=1−α
α
r(t)







ρ − (1 − α)η
α
S0e
(1−α)η−ρ
α t. (101)
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